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Therefore, at present a partnership is not subject to the provisions
of Section 16 if one of its partners is a director of a corporation unless
deputization is proven. This imposes a difficult burden of proof in an
action against such a partnership to recover short swing profits. Although inequitable on its face, the courts may balance the scales of
justice in the future by making a more liberal and common sense appraisal of evidence indicating deputization in fact. If in fact such a
liberal approach is not followed it will then be incumbent on Congress
to act, if any teeth are to remain in the Act. Likewise, only Congressional amendment of 16(b) will impose liability upon a partnership for
short swing profits without proof of deputization where one of its
members is a director of the company at whose expense the partnership
so profited.
For comparison purposes, it might be pointed out that the courts
did not allow one other devastating wedge to be driven into the Act.
Namely, the attempt of the partner-director to waive his right to any
profit made by the partnership from the purchase of such stock and
thus disclaim any individual liability for his proportionate share. This
scheme was disallowed under the theory that such profits were nevertheless in contemplation of law realized by him. The court of appeals
felt that allowing such waiver would be too wide a breach in the intent
of the law.2 3 It might be questioned why the Court of Appeals wasn't
equally concerned with the breach in the intent of the law which they
were prepared to allow in freeing the partnership from any liability.
In the final analysis the Supreme Court may have closed the breach
substantially when it accepted the deputization theory. Only Congressional action or federal courts concerned with preserving the intent of
the law and using deputization as a foothold can in fact save the Act.
Failure to do so will
leave a large and unintended loophole in the statute-one substantially eliminating 2the
great Wall Street Trading firms from
4

the statute's operation.
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Negligence-Abolition of the Defense of Municipal ImmunityAn action was brought on behalf of a minor by her guardian ad litem
against the City of Milwaukee to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained while playing on a City playground. The minor's father
joined in the action to recover damages for medical expenses and for
the loss of her society and companionship. The plaintiff, a three and
one-half year old child was playing on a playground known as a "totlot," operated by the City of Milwaukee for the use and enjoyment of
Blau v. Lehman, supra note 13, at 791.
24 BIau v. Lehman, supra note 13.
23
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pre-school age children. She was injured when a steel trapdoor fell on
her hands. The trapdoor, normally used to cover a water meter pit at a
drinking fountain maintained by the City, had been negligently left in
an unsecured position by a City employee. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee.'
The defendant City demurred to the complaint on the ground that
the City was immune to liability in a case of this nature. The trial court
sustained the demurrer. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff
contended that "(a) the drinking fountain and the water meter pit
trapdoor were created and maintained by the City in its proprietary
capacity, or (b) the meter contraption constituted a nuisance and at
the time the injury occurred the relationship of governor and governed
did not exist between Janet Holytz and the City of Milwaukee, or (c)
the trapdoor was an 'attractive nuisance' that was not created or maintained by the City in a governmental capacity. ' 2 In its decision, the
Supreme Court passed over all of the appellant's contentions, saying:
".... we are now prepared to disavow those rulings of this court which
have created and preserved the doctrine of governmental immunity
from tort claims. This makes it unnecessary that we rest this case on
the elusive issues mentioned in the foregoing paragraph: the case turns
exclusively on our abrogation of the principle of governmental immu3
nity from tort claims."
As authority for its action, the Court referred to decisions in other
states which in abolishing the immunity had called the doctrine anachronistic, 4 mistaken and unjust, 5 unsupported by any valid reason,"
and an unjust burden on the individual citizen.7 Further, it quoted the
following with approval:
•.. it cannot be urged. . . that an outmoded... curtailment
of a general rule of action created by the judicial branch . . .
should not be removed by its creator .... s
We closed our courtroom doors without legislative help, and
we can likewise open them.9
...the courts should be alive to the demands of justice.'0
The Holytz case is a significant example of a trend which the Wisconsin Court appears to be setting, to wit: that it will invoke its full
legal and equitable powers in aid of petitioners who come before it with
117

Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962).

2Id. at 29.

SIbid.

4Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, (Fla. 1957), 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (1957).
5 Muscopf v. Corning Hospital District, 11 Cal. 89, 359 P. 2d 457, 458 (1961).
6 Molitor v. Kaneland Community District No. 302, 18 Ill. App. 2d 11, 163 N.E.
7 2d 89, 96 (1959).
Hernandez v. County
8

of Yuma, 91 Az. 35, 369 P. 2d 271, 272 (1962).
McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A. 2d 820, 832 (1960).
9 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
260 P. 2d 765, 774 (1953).
10 Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, (Fla. 1957), 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (1957).
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just claims, but who have been prevented from recovering by prior
judicial decisions no longer having any reasonable basis.
In adopting the reasoning expressed above by other courts, the Supreme Court abandoned its previous position, that if the doctrine of
municipal immunity was to be abolished, it was the responsibility of the
Legislature to do so;" that questions of public policy should be addressed to the Legislature and answered by them ;12 and that the Legislature's failure to enact a bill was evidence of the Legislature's intent
that the law not be changed.' Once again the Wisconsin Court has held
that "The rule of stare decisis, however desirable from the standpoint
of certainty and stability, does not require us to perpetuate a doctrine
that should no longer be applicable.. .."14
No longer can there be any doubt that the Wisconsin Court is prepared to change the law to avoid an injustice, even though it has declared in the past that the specific change involved a matter of public
policy and should therefore be made by the Legislature. The Holytz
and Kojis cases 15 bear this out. It is now reasonable to expect that the
Wisconsin Court will take a new look at questions of law which involve
public policy when there have been numerous calls for reform. It is
much less likely now than it once was, that the Court will restrain itself
from acting on the ground that the doctrine in question, although in
need of reform, is a question of public policy and can only be reformed
by the Legislature. Where a doctrine has been engrafted into the law
by the Courts, the judiciary is free to change or abolish it.16
In the Holytz case the Court not only determined that its decision
to abolish municipal immunity was applicable to the case at bar and to
those cases involving claims for tortious acts committed by the agents,
servants or employees of the municipalities arising after July 15, 1962,
but extended its ruling beyond the facts before it by declaring under
what other circumstances the new ruling would apply and to whom it
7
would apply.'
While one can never predict with certainty just how far and in exactly what direction an apparent trend of decisions will go, there may
Flamingo v. Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W. 2d 24 (1952); Britten v. Eau
Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W. 2d 30 (1952).
12 Smith v. City of Jefferson, 8 Wis. 2d 378, 99 N.W. 2d 119 (1959) ; Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93
N.W. 2d 867 (1959) ; Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W.
2d 896 (1953) ; Flamingo v. Waukesha, supra note 11; Britten v. Eau Claire,
supra note 11.
1 Smith v. City of Jefferson, supra note 12; Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, supra note 12.
14 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 372, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 133 (1961).
15 Id. at 367, 107 N.W. 2d at 131.
16 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962) ; Bielski
v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
17 Hoyltz v. City of Milwaukee, supra note 16, at 39-42, 115 N.W. 2d at 625-626.
11
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be practical value in considering certain other traditional immunities
which may sooner or later be abolished by court decree.
When the Court abolished the immunity of a charitable hospital to
paying patients for torts committed against them by the employees of
the hospital,18 it specifically declined to decide whether a charitable hospital would continue to be immune to the tort claims of non-paying
patients.1 9 Further, there has been no determination of the question
whether a religious organization will continue to enjoy its immunity to
tort claims. When the Court first recognized the immunity in 1917,20 it
did so chiefly because it was afraid that if charitable and religious organizations were held liable in tort for the acts of their agents, servants
or employees, the financial resources of such institutions would be so
badly depleted that they would no longer be able to carry on their beneficial works. In abolishing the immunity of hospitals to the tort claims
of paying patients, 21 the Court rested its decision largely on the fact
that charitable hospitals are now generally able to pay the claims made
against them.

22

If a charitable hospital should be liable to paying patients because
it has the resources to meet such claims, should it not also be liable for
the claims of non-paying patients? And should not the same reasoning
apply with equal force to claims against religious organizations? The
Court has said: "They (charitable hospitals) are now larger in size,
better equipped, and on a more sound economic basis. Insurance covering their liability is available and prudent management would dictate
that such protection be purchased." 23 Insurance can be purchased by
charitable hospitals to cover the claims of non-paying patients as well
as the claims of paying patients. Religious organizations can obtain
insurance covering their tort liability. If an organization's "ability to
pay" is the deciding factor, it seems likely that the new rule, so far
applied only to paying patients, will be extended to abolish the immunity
of charitable hospitals to non-paying patients. That the Court is looking
in this direction may be indicated from its comment, in abolishing the
immunity to paying patients, that it was "particularly impressed '24 with
Justice Rutledge's reasoning: "Retention [of immunity] for the non18 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961).
19 Note, Limitation on Tort Immunity of CharitableHospitals, 1961 Wis. L. REv.

509; Note, Abolition of the Defense of Charitable Imnunity, 45 MARQ. L. REv.
128 (1961).
20 Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N.W. 176 (1917).
21 Note, Limitation on Tort Immunity of CharitableHospitals, 1961 Wis. L. Rev.
509; Note, Abolition of the Defense of CharitableImmunity, 45 MARQ. L. REv.
128, (1961).
22 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 372, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 133 (1961).
"The financial statement of the defendant clearly shows that the judgment fordamages in the present action would not cause it to suspend its operations or
to be seriously hampered therein."
23 Id. at 372, 107 N.W. 2d at 133.
2 Ibid.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

paying patient is the least defensible and most unfortunate of the disHe should be the first to have reparation, not
tinctions refinements ....
' 25
the last and least among those who receive it."

Throughout the many years it maintained the doctrine of immunity
of charitable and religious organizations for the tortious acts of their
servants, agents and employees, the Court's chief concern seemed to
have been that the imposition of liability would unduly impair the ability of such organizations to carry on their socially beneficial activities.
Now that the Court feels such danger has disappeared, it seems quite
likely that the Court will completely abolish the last remaining vestiges
of the doctrine.

26

Another existing immunity which it seems likely the Court will
abolish, is the immunity of a parent to a claim for damages by his unemancipated child for injuries to his person caused by the tortious
conduct of his parent. This immunity has been recognized in Wisconsin
since 1927.27 It has been criticized by members of the Court and by
legal writers. 28 In considering the doctrine in the past, the Court has
"passed the buck" to the Legislature. The familiar words have been
pronounced: let the legislature abolish the rule if modern policy requires a change ;29 or, since the legislature has not acted, the Court must
presume that public policy is not to be changed. 30 Such words of the
3
Court, however, pre-date the recent abolition of municipal immunity '
32
and the immunity of a charitable hospital to its paying patients.
25

President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D.C. 123,

130 Fed. 2d 810, 827 (1942).
0Duncan v. Steeper, 17 Wis. 2d 226, 238-239, 116 N.W. 2d 154, 160 (1962). "On
principle we now can perceive of no justification for limiting the abrogation
of the charitable immunity to indigent or non-paying patients. In fact, the poor,
who sustain injury as the result of negligent acts of charitable institutions, or
their agents or employees, should not be discriminated against by a rule which
would retain the defense of charitable immunity against their claims for damages, and abolish it with respect to more financially blessed citizens who are
able to pay for all services received at the hands of charitable organizations.
We doubt if the insurance now carried by charitable institutions against liability for tort makes any distinction between paying and charitable patrons.
We make these observations to indicate that the rule of the Kojis case abolishing charitable tort immunity may not be limited to situations where a charge
or fee was being paid for the services being rendered to the injured person."
27 Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); Zutter v. O'Connell 200
Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930) ; Groh v. W. 0. Krahn, 223 Wis. 662, 271 N.W.
374 (1937) ; Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940) ; Cronin v.
Cronin, 244 Wis. 372, 12 N.W. 2d 677 (1944) ; Fidelity Savings Band v. Aulik,
252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W. 2d 613 (1948) ; Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W. 2d 867 (1959).
28 Wick v. Wick, supra note 27 (Dissenting Opinion); Schwenkhoff v. Farmers
Mutual Insurance Co., supra note 27 (Concurring Opinion) ; Shealy, Right of

2

Unentancipated Child to Sue Parentfor a Personal Tort, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 176.
Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 6 Wis. 2d 44, 93 N.W. 2d 867
(1959) ; Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W. 613 (1948).
30 Schwenkhoff v. Famners Mutual Insurance Co., supra note 29.
31 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618, (1962).
32 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961).
29
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The declared reasons for holding parents immune to claims by their
children are to preserve (1) family tranquility, (2) family resources,
and (3) parental authority. 3 However, in Wisconsin a wife may sue
her husband ;34 an unemancipated child may sue one standing in loco
parentis;35 an unemancipated brother may sue an unemancipated
brother ;36 an unemancipated child may sue his father's estate for the
loss of his mother's society and companionship because of the tortious
conduct of the father, 37 and a parent may sue an unemancipated son for
the death of another son under the death by wrongful act statute.38
In all of these instances the Wisconsin Court has found that suits
between members of the same family have not disturbed the tranquility
of the family, or the resources of the family, or the authority of the
father as head of the household.
Perhaps one reason for such a finding is the fact that liability insurance is now available to members of a family at a reasonable cost.
Since parents carry insurance out of which strangers may recover their
claims, why should their own unemancipated children be denied such
protection ? Some have suggested that the danger of collusion between
parent and child is a valid reason for the distinction. But is the danger
of collusion any greater where an insured parent is sued by his unemancipated child than in those instances outlined above where the
Court already allows members of a family to sue one another for their
wrongful acts ?40 It seems reasonably safe to predict that, before long,
the Court will take the next logical step and abolish parental immunity
from the tort claims of unemancipated children.
The converse of parental immunity has also been the rule in Wisconsin, namely that a father cannot sue his unemancipated son for injuries caused by the child's tortious conduct. Here also it has been said
41
that if any change is to be made it must be made by the Legislature.
Again it is suggested, in line with the recent trend of decisions, that
this is an area in which the Court may act without waiting for the
Legislature.
It seems quite possible, considering the Court's attitude in the Holytz
and KojiS42 cases, that the Court will not only abolish traditional immunities and defenses which are determined to be archaic and unjust
33 Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
34 Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
3 Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173 (1925).
36
Bielke v. Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932).
3
TLasecd v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).

38 Munsert v. Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N.W. 671 (1939);
Wis. STATS. §331.03 (1959).

3 Comment, Right of an Uneinancipated Child to Sue Parentfor a Personal Tort,

1938 Wis. L. REv. 176.

40 Ibid.
41 Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W. 2d 613 (1948).
42 Kojis v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961).
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in light of present day conditions, but may go even further, where injustice would otherwise clearly result, and create a new right and a corresponding duty in the absence of Legislative action. Justification for
such judicial lawmaking might be argued, for example, with respect to
a right of privacy in Wisconsin. 43 Currently, Wisconsin is one of the
few states which do not in any way recognize such a right. 44 The modern
trend towards recognizing such a right began in 1890 with the publication of a famous article urging the necessity of its recogniti6n. 4 5
Through the years prominent writers in the tort field have generally
advocated the enforcement of such a right. 46 An eminent American
lawyer has declared that the invasion of the privacy of an individual
"... may produce suffering much more acute than that produced by a
mere bodily injury." 47 An indication of its general acceptance has been
the demand for a uniform law in this area.48 In light of the almost universal recognition of the need of the right of privacy, and in view of
the tendency of the Wisconsin Court to depart from its traditional re49
luctance to exercise the "legislative" prerogative in policy matters,
it seems at least possible that, if it receives a case involving a serious
invasion of the privacy of an individual causing the individual great
harm, the Court may act affirmatively to protect the "right of privacy"
even without prior legislative action.
Historically, especially since the development of courts of equity,
the common law has found the means, where justice seemed to demand
it, to "make" the law as well as interpret it. Recent Wisconsin Supreme
Court decisions, with respect to immunities which have outlived the
reasons for their existence, give every indication that judicial lawmaking
is still a vital ingredient of our legal system.
FREDERICK MUTH

Insurance: Liability of an Agent or Fraud-In Anderson v.
Knox,' the plaintiff brought an action for fraud and misrepresentation
against an agent of the New York Life Insurance Company. The plaintiff alleged that the insurance agent, Anderson, had falsely and fraudulently induced his wife and him to purchase $150,000 worth of bank
financed life insurance, representing this as a suitable policy, in line
4 Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W. 2d 925 (1956) ; State ex rel Distenfeld v.Neelen, 255 Wis. 214, 38 N.W. 2d 703 (1949); Judevine v. Benzies

Mortgage Fuel and Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295 (1936).

44 Note, Tie Right of Privacy in Wisconsin, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 332.
45 Brandeis and Warren, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
46 PAOSSER, TORTS 635 (2d Ed. 1955); HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 677 (1956);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §867 (1939).
47 Pound, Interests of Personality,28 HARV. L. REv. 343, 363 (1915).
48 Ludwig, Peace of Mind in 48 Pieces v. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN.
L. REv. 734 (1948).
49 Hoyltz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962); Kojis
v. Doctor's Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131 (1961).
1297 F. 2d 702 (1961).

